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Abstract Why has polygyny, marriage of a man to multiple women, common in most
societies throughout history, almost disappeared in modern industrialized countries?
Do women play a role in its disappearance? A simple theoretical model suggests
that at the later stage of the transition from polygyny to monogamy, the spread of
human capital and the increase of labor income have led to the rise of monogamy.
A general equilibrium model of the marriage market illustrates that the spread of
human capital results in an increase in women’s income opportunities and lowers
the importance of bequests in determining their sons’ incomes. Both effects improve
women’s outside option, mating monogamously, and decrease the marginal benefit
of the economic advantages provided by polygynous unions. This, in turn, reduces
polygyny by increasing the cost of polygynous mating for men. When the human
capital level is sufficiently high, men find it optimal to marry monogamously instead
of bearing the high cost of polygynous mating.
Keywords Marriage · Polygyny · Monogamy · Development · Human capital
JEL Classification J12 · J24 · O10 · O40 · Z13
1 Introduction
Polygynous mating is a global phenomenon in the sense that it has occurred in
most societies throughout history. For example, Murdock’s Ethnographic Atlas men-
tions that polygyny exists in 850 of 1,170 societies although to varying degrees
(Hartung et al. 1982). Similarly, human relations area files documents that 93% of
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1,154 recorded societies recognize some degree of polygyny (Clark 1998). Moreover,
polygyny is not an issue of the past. We still observe polygynous marriage at a rate
of up to 55% in many sub-Saharan African countries (Tertilt 2005). For example,
the percentage of married men in a polygynous union is 55% in Cameroon and 40%
in Senegal and Burkina Faso. However, polygynous mating is almost nonexistent in
developed countries. This is referred to as the mystery of monogamy (Gould et al.
2008). These observations lead to the following questions: Why did the marriage type
evolve into monogamy during the course of economic development? Which factors
determine the form of marriage in a given society?
Existing studies answering these questions commonly focus on changes in the
demand for females. Lagerlof (2005) illustrates decreasing quantity of demand as a
result of the decline in income inequality among men. Becker (1991) explains the
nonexistence of polygyny in advanced economies with the shift in men’s demand
from quantity of children to quality of children. Similar to Becker (1991) and Gould
et al. (2008) explain the nonexistence of polygyny as a result of the trade-off between
the quantity and quality of children. However, they present a different mechanism
and propose that when the return on human capital is high, a rich man may choose
to marry one well-educated, high skilled woman who can provide human capital to
his children, rather than mating with many women to increase the number of chil-
dren.1 Possibly because of the fact that women did not have much decision-making
power in marriages or access to economic resources in the early stage of the transi-
tion from polygyny to monogamy, the existing literature focuses on the demand side
changes. Yet, does it mean that women played no role in the virtual disappearance of
polygyny?
Historical accounts of the transition from polygyny to monogamy in the Western
World suggest that polygyny was prevalent up to the industrialization. Industrilization
increased women’s autonomy in marriages and access to economic resources, espe-
cially their labor income, significantly. Actually, it is not easy to establish the exact
timing of the virtual disappearance of polygynousmating. However,many sociologists
and anthropologists argue that in medieval Europe richmen, althoughmarriedmonog-
amously, had sexual access to servants, concubines and mistresses, so they continued
to mate polygynously (e.g., Gould et al. 2008; Stone 1961, 1977; Goody 1983; Grimal
1986; Betzig 1992, 1995, 2002; Scheidel 2009, 2011). For example, Stone (1961)
writes about this widespread practice in England in the late medieval period that “In
the sixteenth century the provision in wills for illegitimate children indicates that the
1 This issue is also a common research field for anthropology and sociology. In anthropology literature,
Melotti (1981) explains the transition to monogamy as a result of evolution. He argues that monogamous
mating is evolutionarily superior to polygyny when considering altruism among children. MacDonald
(1990), Betzig (1986) and Alexander (1987) argue that this phenomenon is the result of egalitarianism or
the need for cohesion in democratic—industrialized countries where the division of labor or the ’rule of
law’ is prominent. In a recent paper, Lagerlof (2010) extends and formalizes ideas discussed in Alexander
(1987). In sociology literature, Kanazawa and Still (1999) assert that women choose to marry polygynously
when wealth inequality among men is high and choose monogamy if the inequality declines sufficiently. In
a political economy framework, Croix and Mariani (2012) argue that decreasing inequality among males
can lead poor women and poor men to form a coalition supporting monogamy as the socially imposed
marriage regime.
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maintenance by a peer of a lower-classmistress was compatible with a stablemarriage,
and that it was fairly frequent occurrence.” Anthropologist Laura Betzig argues that
the same pattern continued up to the twentieth century when, after a longer gradual
decline, polygynous mating died out. Particularly, Betzig (1995) writes that “When,
why did polygyny and despotism end, andmonogamy and democracy begin?...It seems
to me that one event changed all that: the switch to an industrial economy in Europe
in the past few centuries.” This timing fits well with the spread of human capital and
the increasing role of women both in the economy and in marriage decisions.
Moreover, several studies employing cross-sectional and cross-cultural data show
that women’s human capital level, their socio-economic position and the degree of
polygyny go hand in hand. Lesthaeghe and Surkyn (1988) and Lesthaeghe et al. (1989)
conducted cross-sectional comparative analyses of polygyny in Africa and found that
polygyny is less prevalent in societies where more adult women are literate. Similarly,
Kaufmann and Meekers (1998), based on their findings researching marriage patterns
in Sub-Saharan Africa, argue that “where women have higher status on their own right
and therefore possess a measure of autonomy through inheritance rights, education,
or matriliny, polygyny is not as common.” Although these findings do not necessitate
causality, they open the door for the potential role of women in the transition from
polygyny to monogamy.2
Findings of field studies and research based on micro-data are more suggestive
concerning the role ofwomen in the transition. For example, study ofAhmed (1986) on
Yoruba women in Western Nigeria shows that women’s education and the occupation
of women’s parents have a strong influence on the type of marriage women enter.
Comparing the differential impact of individual characteristics on the type of marriage
women enter, he finds that higher educated women are less likely to be involved in
a polygynous union, and the higher the occupational level of a woman’s parents,
the less likely she is to marry a polygynist. There is also supporting evidence for
the aforementioned role of women in the transition to monogamy in Clignet (1970),
Grossbard (1976), Gould et al. (2008), Ware (1979) and Armstrong et al. (1993).
Based on these observations, the goal of this paper is to focus on the supply side
changes and to analyze women’s role in the virtual disappearance of polygyny. I argue
that at the later stage of the transition frompolygyny tomonogamy, the spread of human
capital and the increase of the value of women’s income opportunities have led to the
virtual disappearance of polygyny in modern industrialized countries. Specifically, I
demonstrate that above a sufficiently high level of human capital, polygynous mating
disappears.
I build a framework where there are two groups of men with different income
levels, while all women are identical. Each individual values consumption, spending
time together (the amount of marital interaction with the mate), number of offspring
and future incomes of children.
2 Some papers in the related literature argue that the causality between economic development and the
degree of polygyny might be reverse. For example, Tertilt (2005) shows that enforcing monogamy may
lower fertility and result in an increase in saving. She estimates that banning polygyny may lead GDP per
capita to go up by 170%. Similarly, Tertilt (2006) shows that increasing female autonomy in marital choices
may increase GDP per capita by lowering the degree of polygyny.
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Men and women differ in their reproductive ability.3 Women are assumed to be
biologically constrained to have a finite number of children and they cannot increase
their offspring by increasing the number of their spouses. On the other hand, men can
increase the number of their children by increasing the number of their mates. This
gives men an incentive to marry polygynously and it yields competition among men
for mates. All else equal, a woman’s utility decreases with the number of women in
the household since, as the number of woman increases, the marital interaction per
wife decreases. In order to marry polygynously, men have to compensate for the loss
in women’s utility due to lower marital interaction. The compensation takes the form
of transfers to each wife and higher bequests to children, more than they would get
in a monogamous marriage. These economic advantages that need to be offered in
polygynous marriage also constitute the cost of polygyny for men.
An increase in the level of human capital alters the cost of polygynous mating
in various ways. First, the spread of human capital results in an increase in women’s
incomeopportunities,mainly through its effect on the level of labor income.As a result,
women allocate more resources for their own consumption and leave larger bequests
to their children. Therefore, economic advantages provided by men in polygynous
mating become relatively less important and men need to increase the amount of
economic resources to compensate for women’s forgone utility resulting from sharing
their husbands with co-wives. This makes polygynous mating more costly for men
and decreases the degree of polygyny in the society. Second, an increase in the level of
humancapital leadswomen to anticipate that the importanceof bequests in determining
their sons’ income will be lower. Thus, the marginal benefit that they derive from the
bequests left to their sons diminishes. Consequently, as the level of human capital
increases, a man who tries to convince a woman to participate in polygynous mating
needs to increase the amount of economic resources to her or to increase the amount
of the bequest left to her son. Hence, the incidence of polygyny declines as the human
capital of children increases. It is worth noting that this change does not happen due
to men’s demand shift from the quantity to quality of children, known as the quantity-
quality trade-off, but rather due to the increased cost of polygynous mating.
In other words, in an economy where the level of human capital and, relatedly, the
value of women’s income opportunities (excluding the economic transfers provided
by their mates) such as labor income are low, a rich man can persuade a woman
to become involved in a polygynous union instead of marrying monogamously by
offering few economic advantages for her or her children. Therefore, inequality in
economic resources translates into inequality in the number ofwives in the competitive
marriage market of this economy. However, the increase of return on human capital
and labor income decreases the marginal benefit of the economic advantages provided
in polygynous unions and leads to a substantial increase in the cost of polygyny for
men. Consequently, in an economy with a sufficiently high human capital level men
find it optimal to marry monogamously instead of bearing the high cost of polygynous
mating, which gives rise to monogamy even in the presence of high income inequality.
3 Siow (1998) studies a model of differential fecundity and how it can affect labor and marriage market
outcomes.
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This paper is the first to introduce a supply-side explanation for the phenomenon.
I show that the virtual disappearance of polygyny and the presence of the quantity-
quality trade-off for children arise from the increasing cost of polygyny that occurs
with the spread of human capital. Hence, the hypothesis offers a new perspective and
complements the previous demand side explanations.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section2 introduces the model. Sec-
tion 3 examines the model, presents the results and discusses existing anthropological
and cross-country findings on the issue. Section 4 analyzes the robustness of the the-
ory. In this section, I show that the main result extends for partial female labor force
participation and discuss the implications of female autonomy. Section 5 provides a
concluding summary.
2 The model
The model is a variation of Gould et al. (2008). I consider a static general equilibrium
of themarriagemarket with a continuum ofmen andwomen.4 Population sizes of both
genders are equal and normalized to 1. The economy produces a single homogeneous
good, using efficiency units of labor as its sole input. Output of a man and a woman is
equal to h, which is exogenously given and equivalent to the human capital of a person.
Human capital could be any skill that makes a person more productive in the labor
market.5 For simplicity, I normalize the cost of human capital investment to zero.6
Marriage in the model can be thought of as an agreement between the husband
and the wife over the division of household resources among them and their children.
A man can marry a woman if he provides her with the equilibrium utility level, to
be described in more detail below, determined in the competitive marriage market,
uw. Marriage is not restricted to monogamy. However, since the analysis focuses on
polygyny and monogamy, I specify the utility functions so that staying single and
polyandrous mating are not possible in equilibrium.7
Men and women have similar preferences. Each man and woman gets utility from
consumption, cm and cw respectively. They also get utility from the number and the
total income of own children. Specifically, bothmen andwomen get utility fromhuman
capital, h, of both sons and daughters. However, each parent gets utility from the total
bequest left to sons only.8 The bequests left from the father and from the mother are
denoted by, bm and bw, respectively.
4 In Appendix C I show that the results also carry over to a dynamic overlapping model with an infinite
horizon.
5 In the model economy, all women participate in the labor force. However, in Sect. 4, I show that when
female labor force participation is zero, the second channel that resembles the quantity-quality trade-off is
still at work and the main result extends to the partial female labor force participation.
6 Instead, one can consider that the human capital investment is costly, but the return of the human capital
investment is sufficiently high that parents choose to invest in their children’s human capital.
7 Polyandry marriage is the mating of a woman with multiple men at the same time.
8 The phylogenetic approach argues that parents transfer a greater amount of wealth to their sons in order to
maximize their reproductive-success (Hartung et al. 1982). The specified utility functions in the model can
be considered a reduced form of a more general utility function where agents care about their reproductive
success. Although in the model, the gender inequality in bequests is in extreme form, relaxing this
assumption does not change the results of the paper as long as male biased inequality in bequests is present.
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A central assumption of my model is that time spent together with the mate (emo-
tional and sexual interaction) is a normal good for agents and the amount of marital
interaction negatively depends on the number of co-wives in the household. There is a
substantial empirical literature supporting this assumption. For example, estimates for
joint leisure consumption by couples indicate that bothmen andwomendemand spend-
ing time together with their spouses (Hamermesh 2002). Similarly, Sullivan (1996),
Hallberg (2003), Jenkins and Osberg (2005) and Connelly and Kimmel (2009) find
evidence of this desire for spending time with one’s spouse.9 The literature on marital
happiness and marital stability also provides evidence for the causal affect of amount
of marital interaction on marital happiness (White 1983; Hill 1988; Zuo 1992 and ref-
erences therein). To simplify the analysis, I assume in the benchmark model that only
women value marital interaction and the difference between a woman’s utility derived
from time spent with her mate in monogamous marriage and of that in polygynous
marriage is constant, denoted by λ ∈ +.10
Men choose their quantity of children implicitly by choosing how many wives to
marry, n. In order to simplify the model, I follow Becker (1991) and assume that n
is a continuous variable. Contrary to males, females are biologically constrained to
have two children.11 Although women cannot choose the number of their mates, they
can choose whether to mate monogamously or polygynously. The mating decision of
a woman is denoted by x ∈ {0, 1}, where x = 0 if the mating is monogamous, and
x = 1 if the mating is polygynous (n > 1).
In particular, preferences of men are represented by the following utility function
ln cm + ln [n (2h + bw + bm)] , (1)
whereas a woman’s utility function is given by
ln cw + ln (2h + bw + bm) − λx (2)
A woman earns income in the labor market (Iw = h). Moreover, she receives a
transfer from her husband, y. Aman’s income is the sum of bequests received from his
parents and his labor income. There are two groups of men according to their income
levels, rich with income Ir and poor with income Ip. The proportion of poor is given
by θ and that of rich is given by (1 − θ).
9 Parallel to these, several empirical studies also indicate that in polygynous marriages, co-wives compete,
conflict for and are jealous of the sexual and emotional attention of their husbands (Meekers and Franklin
1990; Mulder 1990; Farrell 1987; Solway 1990; Aluko and Aransiola 2003).
10 This assumption also results in men’s and women’s utility functions being asymmetric in the benchmark
model. Nonetheless, the asymmetry in men’s and women’s utility functions is relaxed in Appendix B.
Specifically, I assume in Appendix B that (all else equal) a man’s and a woman’s utility is a continuous
function of time spent together with the mate (both of them value marital interaction) and a man divides
his limited time equally among his wives. I show that under these assumptions, the second channel is still
at work and the main result holds.
11 The size of the upper bound on women’s fertility is not critical. Thus, the number of children of a woman
can be assumed to be more than two. The results are valid as long as there exists a limit on women’s fertility.
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A woman’s and a man’s budget constraints are given by
cw + bw = Iw + y (3)
cm + n (bm + y) = Im , (4)
where Im ∈ {Ir , Ip}.
Finally, the bequest decisions of men and women are sequential. First, the husband
decides the bequest level per son, bm , and the income transfer level per wife, y. In the
second stage, each wife takes the bequest and income transfer decision of the husband
as given and then decides the amount of bequest, bw, to her son.12 In order to simplify
the analysis by avoiding corner solutions, I allow negative values of the bequest left
by a woman, which may be interpreted as an income transfer from son to his mother
after he starts to work in the labor market.
3 Analysis
Each woman chooses her consumption, cw, the bequest transfer to her son, bw, and
the type of mating to enter into, x , to maximize (2) subject to (3), given the amount
of income transfer and the bequest left to her son by her husband:
max{x, cw, bw}
ln cw + ln (2h + bw + bm) − λx s.t. cw + bw = Iw + y
Each man chooses his consumption, cm , the number of wives, n, the amount of
income transfer to each wife, y, and the bequests for each of his sons, bm , to maximize
(1) subject to (4) and non-negativity constraints, given women’s equilibrium utility,
uw:
max{cm , n, y, bm }
ln cm + ln [n (2h + bw + bm)]
s.t. cm + n (bm + y) = Im, bm, y ≥ 0, ln cw + ln (2h + bw + bm) − λx ≥ uw
The last constraint can be considered as the participation constraint of a woman to
enter into a polygynous marriage.
Finally, market clearance implies that all women are married in equilibrium.
Lemma 1 In polygynous mating the sum of the income transfer to each woman and
bequest to her son is higher than the sum of those in monogamous mating. The differ-












12 Compared to simultaneous decision-making this bequest decision pattern is more in line with patriarchy.
Thus, I intentionally kept the pattern in this form. However, changing the pattern does not affect the results.
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Proof Substituting (3) into (2) and deriving the first-order condition with respect to
bw yields
bw = Iw + y − 2h − bm
2
(5)
By substituting (5) and (3) into the participation constraint, one can rewrite this
constraint in the following form:
2 ln
(
Iw + y + 2h + bm
2
)
− λx ≥ uw (6)
In the polygynous equilibrium, men’s optimization requires that (6) holds with
equality. Thus, (6) and x ∈ {0, 1} together imply that
y + bm = 2Uk − Iw − 2h if n > 1 (7)
y + bm = 2U − Iw − 2h if n ≤ 1 (8)
where U ≡ exp( uw2 ) and k ≡ exp( λ2 ). (7) and (8) represent the sum of the income
transfer to each woman and the bequest to her son in polygynous mating and the sum
of those in monogamous mating, respectively. Subtracting (8) from (7) produces the
result.
The intuition underlying Lemma 1 is straightforward. A man who marries polyg-
ynously provides less marital interaction to each of his wives compared to a man in a
monogamous marriage. Hence, the man in a polygynous marriage has to compensate
for each of his wives’ forgone utility that results from sharing him with co-wives.
There are two ways he can do this. He could offer a higher income transfer to his wife
or a higher amount of bequest to her son than she would receive in a monogamous
marriage. The difference can be interpreted as the cost of polygynous mating for men.
Figure 1 represents the relation between the cost of polygyny and women’s equilib-
rium utility level, uw. It shows that as uw increases, men need to offer a higher amount
of income transfer to a woman, y, and bequest, bm , for her son in order to compensate
for her forgone utility in polygyny, λ. The cost of polygynous mating increases with
uw at an increasing rate. As a result, any factor that improves women’s utility also
increases the cost of polygynous mating for men. Figure 1 shows that concavity and
monotonicity properties of utility functions, which are standard assumptions, imply
this result.
Lemma 2 Rich men have at least as many wives as poor men.






2Ukx − Iw − 2h
)] + ln (nUkx) s.t. bm, y ≥ 0 (9)
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2(2Uk−Iw−2h) if n > 1
Im
2(2U−Iw−2h) if n ≤ 1
(10)
In the polygynous equilibrium, the characterization of n together with the assumption
Ir > Ip produces the result that a richman hasmore wives than a poorman. Observing
that every man has one wife in the monogamous equilibrium completes the proof.13
The result of the cost of polygyny and the competition among males for women
is that if polygynous mating exists in equilibrium, only men with adequate resources
can afford it. The assumption of a balanced sex ratio in the model implies that only
rich men can marry polygynously. This result is also in line with Becker and Lewis
(1973), Bergstrom (1994b), Wright (1994) and Gould et al. (2008).
The next proposition presents two important factors that affect the degree of polyg-
yny.
Proposition 1 The degree of polygyny is
(i) Positively associated with income inequality among males,
(ii) negatively associated with human capital and income level of women.
Proof See Appendix A.
The intuition behind the first statement of Proposition 1 is as follows.14 Holding
the income of poor men constant, an increase in the income level of rich men enlarges
their choice sets. Concavity and monotonicity of the utility function imply that rich
men are willing to increase their number of wives. On the other hand, holding the
income of rich men constant, a decrease in poor men’s income leads them to leave
smaller bequests to their sons and to transfer fewer resources to their wives. Thismakes
monogamous mating less appealing for women. As a result, more women engage in
polygynous mating.
The proposition also states that an increase in the human capital level and in the
labor income of women decreases the degree of polygyny. As the income of women
increases, the marginal utility of extra economic resources provided in polygynous
mating diminishes. As a result, rich men have to increase the sum of income transfers
and the amount of bequests, if they want to marry polygynously. The intuition for
this statement follows from Lemma 1. As I show in Lemma 1, anything that increases
women’s equilibrium utility also increases the cost of polygyny. Thus, the increase of
women’s human capital level and labor income increases the cost of polygyny through
its effect on uw.
13 Women’s equilibrium utility, uw , and number of wives for rich and poor are explicitly derived in Appen-
dix A.
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Fig. 1 Women’s utility level vs. the cost of polygyny
Proposition 2 The degree of polygyny declines with h and if h is sufficiently high,
polygynous mating is nonexistent in equilibrium.
Proof See Appendix A.
Proposition 2 states the main result of the paper. Above a critical level of human
capital and labor income, monogamy turns out to be the unique mating type in equi-
librium.15 There are two channels in which the increase in human capital and labor
income decreases the degree of polygyny, although each of these channels alone might
lead to the disappearance of polygyny.
The first one is the effect of the spread of human capital through the increase of labor
income of women. As I establish in the second statement of Proposition 1, women’s
human capital and the degree of polygyny are inversely related. As women’s human
capital and, relatedly, labor income increase, so do their equilibrium utility level and
the cost of polygyny (see Fig. 1).
Second, an increase in the level of human capital leads women to anticipate that
their sons will earn a higher income in the labor market. As a result, the benefit that
women derive from the total bequest left to their sons diminishes. This effect coerces
men to provide higher economic advantages in order to compensate forwomen’s utility
loss from polygynous mating. Hence, the cost of polygyny increases and the degree
of polygyny falls.
The second channel resembles a well-known phenomenon: the quantity-quality
trade-off for children. However, in contrast to the existing literature, the shift from
the quantity to quality in this setting occurs due to supply-side reasons. Both Becker
(1991) and Gould et al. (2008) argue that as the return on human capital increases, men
prefer to have fewer but higher quality children. As a result, the degree of polygyny
15 The threshold of the human capital level is explicitly given in the appendix.
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falls. On the other hand, Proposition 2 states that the decline arises from the increasing
cost of polygyny rather than the demand shift of men.
Results of an informative survey carried out in Kenya support the effectiveness of
the emphasized cost-side changes in explaining the decline of polygyny. To analyze
changing family and kinship in Kenya, Adams and Mburugu (1994) surveyed the
Kikuyu who the authors regard as the most changed or urbanized of the Kenyan
peoples. According to their survey, there was a fall in polygyny at the start of 1990
(from 28% of the respondents’ fathers to an expectation of 16% of the 30–40years
olds respondents) and the primary reason for this fall is the increasing cost of polygyny
and rising standard of living expectations. Based on their findings, the authors report
that “cost is central” for monogamy and they conclude that “In fact, if the results of
this pilot study are generalizable, cost plus the effects of higher education may be
sufficient to limit polygyny...”
4 Robustness
In the previous section, I show the transition from polygynous equilibrium to monog-
amous equilibrium under implicit assumptions of full female labor force participation
and ultimate female autonomy in marriage decisions. Although these assumptions are
innocuous for current advanced countries, one can question their validity in the pre-
industrial world. Nonetheless, I argue that the mechanism behind the main result is
still effective even when these assumptions are relaxed, as I show below.
First, I investigate whether the main result holds if only a fraction of females
participates in the labor force. For this purpose, I modify the model by assuming an
exogenous female labor force participation rate, ε, which is less than unity. The next
proposition states that the main result of the paper extends under the assumption of
partial female labor force participation.16
Proposition 3 For all ε ∈ [0, 1), the degree of polygyny declines with h and if h is
sufficiently high, polygynous mating is nonexistent in equilibrium.
Proof See Appendix A.
The intuition behind Proposition 3 follows from the discussion in Sect. 2. Even
if some females do not participate in the labor force, an increase in labor income in
line with the spread of human capital still increases the equilibrium utility level of all
women. As the human capital level increases, women anticipate that the labor income
of their sons will increase and so the benefit of the total bequest left to sons diminishes
for women. In other words, the quantity versus quality channel is effective even when
most of females do not work. Moreover, an increase in labor income increases the
utility level of women who participate in the labor force. As argued with Lemma 1,
anything that increases the equilibrium utility level of women also increases the cost
of polygyny. Hence, the findings are robust to the labor force participation of women.
16 I do not provide a theory of female labor force participation here. Such an analysis is beyond the scope
of this study.
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The mechanism described in the paper is still effective in the absence of ultimate
female autonomy in marital choices, as long as at least one of the following assump-
tions holds: (i) women have some degree of decision-making power over their marital
choices or (ii) parents have some degree of altruism towards their daughters. The
validity of the hypothesis under these assumptions is more apparent. Thus, I discuss
the mechanismwithout presenting a formal proof. As it is in the main model, women’s
marginal utility derived from the economic resources provided in polygynous mating
still diminishes with the increase of the human capital level. Since the two mecha-
nisms in the model (the corresponding increase of labor income of women and their
sons) still have the same effects on women’s utility. Here, the key role of assump-
tions (i) and (ii) is that under either assumption women’s declining incentives to enter
into a polygynous marriage, accompanied with the spread of human capital, will be
reflected in marital decisions. Consequently, the cost of polygynous mating for men
increases with an increase in human capital and, once again, the degree of polygyny
being negatively correlated with the level of human capital and labor income remains
as a result.
Moreover, these assumptions are justified with evidence. There are supportive stud-
ies showing that women exert considerable influence over their marital decisions. For
instance, in Togo where more than 40% of women have been involved in polygy-
nous unions, it is documented that over 70% of women have decision-making power
over their marital decisions (Gage 1995). Similarly, parental altruism, that can pro-
vide alignment of interests on marital choices between daughters and their parents,
is also supported by existing studies. For example, in her analysis of 133 societies,
Small (1992) concludes that the interests of females in arranged marriages are not
necessarily different from the interests of their parents.
Hence, the main conclusion of the paper holds even when I relax the assumptions
regarding female autonomy and labor force participation. Crucially the results follow
from the concavity and monotonicity properties of utility functions and women’s
demand formarital interaction,which implieswomenprefermonogamyover polygyny
if all else is equal. The first two assumptions are standard in economic theory and
the last assumption is well-supported by existing empirical evidence. Consequently,
the underlying mechanism works in a more general environment as long as these
assumptions are preserved.
5 Conclusion
This paper examines why advanced countries are more monogamous than less devel-
oped countries. A common feature of developed economies is that the level of human
capital and, relatedly, the average labor income in these countries are much higher
than they are in less developed countries. I argue that this characteristic is the main
reason for the variations in the degree of polygyny among advanced and less developed
countries. I further assert that, through the process of industrialization and economic
development, the spread of human capital and the increase of labor income have led
to the virtual disappearance of polygyny at the later stage of the transition.
The theory is simple and intuitive. I argue that a woman values time spent with her
spouse. If she is involved in polygyny, she enjoys less utility due to a lower amount
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of marital interaction compared to what she would enjoy in a monogamous marriage.
Thus, in order to persuade women to enter into a polygynous marriage, men have
to offer more economic resources than those provided in a monogamous marriage.
These extra payments constitute the cost of polygynous mating for men. The cost
of polygynous mating for men increases with the spread of human capital and the
increase of labor income through two channels: first, the spread of human capital
results in an increase of women’s income opportunities independent of their mates’
incomes, mainly through its effect on the level of labor income. This, in turn, decreases
the marginal benefit of the economic advantages provided in a polygynous union. As a
result, women demand more benefits to enter into a polygynous marriage. Second, the
increase of the human capital level leads women to anticipate that their children can
receive higher labor income, and so it decreases the marginal contribution of bequests
to the total income. Thus, the incentives for women, who care about the income of
their sons, to enter into a polygynous marriage diminish as well. Consequently, an
increase in human capital and labor income leads to a decline in the number of wives
and children of rich men. The second channel implies that the decline in quantity of
children, accompaniedwith the increase of quality of them, arises from the supply-side
changes rather than from men’s demand shift from quantity of children to quality of
them.
Finally, this paper emphasizes that women’s roles are also important in the deter-
mination of observed marriage types in a society. Hence, the results suggest that poli-
cies favoring women, such as encouraging their labor force participation, subsidizing
female education and securing more gender equal inheritance should be considered
as alternative instruments for the prevention of polygyny.
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Appendix A: Proofs
Let n be an element of the set {nr , n p} where nr and n p are the numbers of wives of a
rich man and a poor man, respectively. Let L and M denote the exogenous bequests
received by a rich and a poor man, respectively.
Proof of Proposition 1 Substituting (10) into the market clearing condition (θn p +
(1 − θ)nr = 1) produces the following equation:
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where A ≡ [(1 − θ)Ir − kθ Ip − (k − 1)(4h + 2Iw)]2 + 4Ir kθ Ip(1 − θ). It gives
an expression of U in terms of the exogenous variables for the polygynous equilib-
rium. Notice that although U has two roots, the root with negative
√
A violates (10).
Therefore, the positive root represents U .





2 − 2Iw − 4h
if n > 1
In Lemma 2, I establish that if the equilibrium is polygynous, only rich men marry





2 − 2Iw − 4h
(12)
Taking the derivative of nr with respect to Ir and Ip shows that ∂nr/∂ Ir > 0 and
∂nr/∂ Ip < 0 . Therefore, nr is negatively related to income inequality.
Taking the derivative of nr with respect to Iw yields ∂nr/∂ Iw < 0 which proves
the second statement of Proposition 1.17
Proof of Proposition 2 First, I need to show that ∂nr/∂h < 0. After replacing Iw with
its equivalent h, Ir with L + h and Ip with M + h, nr can be written as follows:
nr = L + h
4Uk − 6h (13)
Similarly, the number of wives of a poor man in the polygynous equilibrium is equal
to
n p = M + h
4U − 6h (14)
The exact expression of the derivative, ∂nr/∂h, is quite complex and it is hard to
determine the sign of it. Thus, I prove that ∂nr/∂h < 0 with a proof by contradiction.
First, notice that ∂nr/∂h and ∂n p/∂h have opposite signs because the proportions
of rich and poor men and the sum of nr and n p is constant. Now, for a contradiction,
assume that ∂nr/∂h > 0. This implies
∂n p
∂h
= 2U + 3M − 2(M + h)(
∂U
∂h )






2(M + h) (16)
17 The derivatives are calculated with Maple and the program codes are available.
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Taking the derivative of nr with respect to h yields
∂nr
∂h
= −2(L + h)(
∂U
∂h ) + 2kU + 3L






2k(L + h) (18)
Equations (16) and (18) together yield
2U + 3M
2(M + h) <
2Uk + 3L
2k(L + h) (19)
However, (11) implies that U > 6(k + 1)h/8k. Also, k > 1 implies (L − M) >
(L − k M) . These two properties together result in
2U + 3M
2(M + h) ≮
2Uk + 3L
2k(L + h) (20)
which is a contradiction. Equating ∂nr/∂h to zero yields a similar contradiction.
Hence, the sign of the derivative, ∂nr/∂h, is negative.
In the second part of the proof, I show that if h is higher than a critical level, the
marriage market equilibrium is monogamous. Equation (10) together with Lemma 2
imply the following two conditions.
Ir
2
> 2Uk − Iw − 2h (21)
Ip
2
≤ 2U − Iw − 2h (22)
Multiplying each side of (22) with k and combining it with (21) yields
L + h
2




+ h + 2h
)
k (23)
Hence, in the polygynous equilibrium, in addition to (10), (23) should hold. Otherwise,
nr cannot be larger than 1. Now, rearranging (23) yields
L − k M
7 (k − 1) > h (24)
Consequently, if h ≥ (L − k M)/7(k − 1), the marriage market equilibrium cannot be
polygynous. This proves the proposition. unionsq
Proof of Proposition 3 In the previous proposition I establish that in the case with full
female labor force participation (ε = 1), if h is sufficiently high, polygynous mating is
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nonexistent in equilibrium. Now, let the female labor force participation rate be zero.





where D ≡ [(1 − θ)Ir − kθ Ip − (k − 1)(4h)]2 + 4Ir kθ Ip(1 − θ).
Taking the derivative of nr with respect to h yields ∂nr/∂h < 0. This shows that the
degree of polygyny falls with the increase of h even if female labor force participation
is assumed to be zero. Similarly, equating Iw to zero in (21) and (22) produces a
necessary condition for the existence of the polygynous equilibrium when none of the
females participates in the labor force.
L + h
2








L − k M
5 (k − 1) > h (27)
Equation (27) shows that in the case of zero female labor force participation, if h ≥
(L − k M)/5(k − 1), the marriage market equilibrium is monogamous. Hence, for all
ε ∈ [0, 1], there exists h∗ ∈ + such that if h ≥ h∗, polygynous mating is nonexistent
in equilibrium. This completes the proof.
Appendix B: Spouses’ shared time
In this section, I argue that keeping the difference constant between utility derived
from the amount of marital interaction in monogamous mating and in polygynous
mating is harmless. Specifically, I show that the second channel is still at work and
the main result holds in a model where a woman’s and a man’s utility is a logarithmic
function of time spent together with the mate andmen divide their limited time equally
among their wives.
The new utility function of a woman takes the following form:
ln cw + ln
(




where T ∈ + denotes the amount of a man’s time endowment and n denotes the
number of women in the household. Similarly, the new utility function of a man takes
the following form:
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Other specifications of the main model remain the same. Substituting (3) into (28) and
deriving the first-order condition with respect to bw yields





A man can marry a woman if he provides her with the equilibrium utility level deter-
mined in the competitive marriage market. This implies the following constraint:
ln cw + ln
(




Substituting (3) and (30) into (31) yields
2 ln
(




Men’s optimization requires that (32) holdswith equality.After arranging, this implies:
y + bm = 2 exp(uw
2
) − Iw − 2h − T
n
(33)
Equation (33) indicates that the sum of the income transfer to each woman and bequest
to her son increaseswith the number ofwomen in the household. Hence, in polygynous
mating, the sum of the income transfer to each woman and the bequest to her son is
higher than the sum of that in a monogamous marriage.






















s.t. bm, y ≥ 0
(34)
Deriving the first-order condition with respect to n produces the following conditions
after rearranging:
n = Im + T
2
(
2 exp( uw2 ) − Iw − 2h
)









2 exp( uw2 ) − Iw − 2h
) (36)
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The result of the characterization of n together with the assumption Ir > Ip is that, in
the polygynous equilibrium, a rich man has more wives than a poor man.





2 exp( uw2 ) − Iw − 2h
) + (1 − θ) Ir + T
2
(
2 exp( uw2 ) − Iw − 2h
) = 1 (37)




) = θ Ip + (1 − θ)Ir + T + 2Iw + 4h
4
(38)
After replacing Iw with its equivalent h, Ir with L +h, Ip with M +h and substituting
(38) into the (35), the equation that characterizes nr can be written as follows:
nr = L + h + T
θ M + (1 − θ)L + h + T
Taking the derivative of nr with respect to h results in ∂nr/∂h < 0. This indicates that
the degree of polygyny declines with the increase in labor income, h.
Appendix C: Dynamic extension
In this section, I present a dynamic extension for the model. I show that my results
carry through to a dynamic overlapping generations model with an infinite horizon.
Let superscript t denote period t and L0 and M0, where L0 > M0, denote the assets of
initial rich and poor, respectively. I assume that h increases with time, i.e. ht+1 > ht .
At time t , a woman’s income is equal to ht and a man’s income is equal to the sum of
the human capital return in that period, ht and the bequests that he receives from his
parents, bt−1w and bt−1m , where bt−1m ∈ {bt−1r , bt−1p }.
First, notice that the results stated in Lemma 1 and 2 and Proposition 1 are time
invariant. Thus, the results are still valid. Moreover, the following equation, which
is the counterpart of (24), shows the necessary condition for the existence of the
polygynous equilibrium in the dynamic model.
Lt−1 − k Mt−1
7 (k − 1) > h
t (39)
Substituting (5) into (7) and (8) implies that in the polygynous equilibrium, total
bequests received by rich and poor men at time t are equal to
bt−1w + bt−1m = U t−1k − 2ht−1 if nt−1 > 1 (40)
bt−1w + bt−1m = U t−1 − 2ht−1 if nt−1 ≤ 1 (41)
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Multiplying (41) with k and subtracting the outcome from (40) yields
Lt−1 − k Mt−1 = 2(k − 1)ht−1 (42)
Equation (42) implies that at time t , the necessary condition for the polygynous equilib-
rium, (39), is not satisfied and as a result, polygynous mating disappears. I should note
that the transition to the monogamous equilibrium is rapid. After the initial period,
polygynous mating disappears. However, the pace of the transition depends on the
structure of wealth transmission and specification of the utility functions.
Next, I show that the endogenous income inequality is preserved in both polygynous
and monogamous equilibriums. First, in the polygynous equilibrium, (40) and (41)
imply that income inequality among males at time t is equal to U t−1(k − 1)/(U t−1 −
2ht−1 + ht ) and it is greater than zero. In the monogamous equilibrium, the solution
of the women’s problem results in
bt−1w =
ht−1 + yt−1 − 2ht − bt−1m
2
(43)
and given n = 1, the solution of the men’s problem implies
yt−1 + bt−1m =
I t−1m − ht−1 − 2ht
2
(44)
Substituting (43) into (44) yields
bt−1w + bt−1m =
ht−1 − 6ht + I t−1m
4
(45)
This shows that if the equilibrium is monogamous, the inequality in period t is equal
to
(






and, once again, it is greater than zero. Hence, I establish
that the endogenously determined income inequality is preserved both in polygynous
and monogamous equilibriums.
The simple model that I present above does not provide a good representation
of the distribution and intergenerational transmission of wealth. One needs a more
sophisticated model to do this. One possibility is to allow for bequest inequalities
among sons, i.e., modeling primogeniture.18 However, my analysis is on marriage
types and not on the transmission of wealth. Also, this simple model still shows
that inferences of the static model hold in the dynamic extension. Hence, in order to
preserve simplicity, I intentionally kept the model in this simple form.
References
Adams B, Mburugu E (1994) Kikuyu bridewealth and polygyny today. J Comp Fam Stud 25(2):159–166
18 Primogeniture is the custom that the eldest son receives nearly all of total bequest left. See Bergstrom
(1994a), DeLong (2003) and Bertocchi (2006) for an extensive discussion of the issue.
123
396 SERIEs (2014) 5:377–397
Ahmed J (1986) Polygyny and fertility differentials among the Yoruba of Western Nigeria. J Biosoc Sci
18(1):63–74
Alexander RD (1987) The biology of moral systems. Aldine de Gruyter, New York
Aluko MAO, Aransiola JO (2003) Peoples’ perception of polygyny in contemporary times in Nigeria.
Anthropology 5(3):179–184
Armstrong A et al (1993) Uncovering reality: excavating women’s rights in African family law. Int J Law
Fam 7:314–369
Becker GS (1991) A treatise on the family. Harvard University Press, Cambridge, MA
Becker GS, Lewis HG (1973) On the interaction between the quantity and quality of children. J Polit Econ
81(2):279–288
Bergstrom T (1994a) Primogeniture, monogamy, and reproductive success in a stratified society. University
of California Working Paper
Bergstrom T (1994b) On the economics of polygyny. University of California Working Paper
Bertocchi G (2006) The law of primogeniture and the transition from landed aristocracy to industrial
democracy. J Econ Growth 11:41–68
Betzig L (1986) Despotism and differential reproduction: a Darwinian view of history. Aldine, New York
Betzig L (1992) Roman polygyny. Ethol Sociobiol 13(5):309–349
Betzig L (1995) Medieval monogamy. J Fam Hist 20(2):181–215
Betzig L (2002) British polygyny. In: SmithM (ed) Human biology and history. Taylor and Francis, London,
pp 30–97
Clark GA (1998) Human monogamy. Science 282:1047–1048
Clignet R (1970) Many wives, many powers: authority and power in polygynous families. Northwestern
University Press, Evanston
Connelly R, Kimmel J (2009) Spousal influences on parents’ non-market time choices. Rev Econ Househ
7:361–394
Croix D, Mariani F (2012) From polygyny to serial monogamy: a unified theory of marriage institutions.
IZA discussion paper 6599
DeLong JB (2003) Bequests: an historical perspective. In: Munnell A, Sunden A (eds) Death and dollars:
the role of gifts and bequests in America. Brookings Institution, Washington, pp 33–63
Farrell M (1987) Measuring maternity. In: Miner V, Longino HE (eds) Competition among women: a
feminist taboo. The Feminist Press, New York, pp 141–151
Gage AJ (1995) Women’s socioeconomic position and contraceptive behavior in Togo. Stud Fam Plan
26(5):264–277
Goody J (1983) The development of the family and marriage in Europe. Cambridge University Press,
Cambridge
Gould ED, Moav O, Simhon A (2008) The mystery of monogamy. Am Econ Rev 98(1):333–357
Grimal P (1986) Love in Ancient Rome. University of Oklahoma Press, Norman
Grossbard A (1976) An economic analysis of polygyny: the case of Maiduguri. Curr Anthr 17(4):701–707
Hallberg D (2003) Synchronous leisure, jointness, and household labor supply. Labour Econ 10:185–202
Hamermesh DS (2002) Timing, togetherness and time windfalls. J Popul Econ 15(4):601–623
Hartung J et al (1982) Polygyny and inheritance of wealth. Curr Anthr 23(1):1–12
Hill MS (1988) Marital stability and spouses’ shared time: a multidisciplinary hypothesis. J Fam Issues
9(4):427–451
Jenkins S, Osberg L (2005) Nobody to play with? The implicatons of leisure coordination. In: Hamermesh
D, Pfann G (eds) The economics of time use. Elsevier, Amsterdam, pp 113–145
Kanazawa S, Still MC (1999) Why monogamy? Soc Forces 78(1):25–50
Kaufmann L, Meekers D (1998) The impact of women’s socioeconomic position on marriage patterns in
Sub-Saharan Africa. J Comp Fam Stud 28(1):101–114
Lagerlof NP (2005) Sex, equality, and growth. Can J Econ 38(3):807–831
Lagerlof NP (2010) Pacifying monogamy. J Econ Growth 15(3):235–262
Lesthaeghe R, Surkyn J (1988) Exchange, production and reproduction: women in Sub-Saharan demo-
graphic regimes. Interuniversity Programme in Demography Working Papers
LesthaegheR,KaufmannG,MeekersD (1989)Thenuptiality regimes inSub-SaharanAfrica. In:Lesthaeghe
R (ed) Reproduction and Social Organization in Sub-Saharan Africa. University of California Press,
Berkeley, pp 238–337
MacDonald K (1990)Mechanisms of sexual egalitarianism inWestern Europe. Ethol Sociobiol 11:195–237
123
SERIEs (2014) 5:377–397 397
Meekers D, Franklin N (1995)Women’s perceptions of polygyny among theKaguru of Tanzania. Ethnology
34(4):315–329
Melotti U (1981) Towards a new theory of the origin of the family. Curr Anthr 22:625–638
MulderMB (1990)Kipsigiswomen’s preferences forwealthymen: evidence for female choice inmammals?
Behav Ecol Sociobiol 27:255–264
Scheidel W (2009) Sex and empire: a Darwinian perspective. In: Schiedel W, Morris I (eds) The dynam-
ics of ancient empires: state power from Assyria to Byzantium. Oxford University Press, New York,
pp 255–324
Scheidel W (2011) Monogamy and polygyny. In: Rawson B (ed) A companion to families in the Greek and
Roman worlds. Wiley-Blackwell, Malden, pp 108–115
Siow A (1998) Differential fecundity, markets, and gender roles. J Polit Econ 106(2):334–354
Small MF (1992) The evolution of female sexuality and mate selection in humans. Hum Nat 3:133–156
Solway JS (1990) Affines and spouses, friends and lovers: the passing of polygyny in Botswana. J Anthr
Res 46:41–66
Stone L (1961) Marriage among the English nobility in the 16th and 17th centuries. Comp Stud Soc Hist
3(2):182–206
Stone L (1977) The family, sex, and marriage in England, 1500–1800. Harper and Row, New York
Sullivan O (1996) Time coordination, the domestic division of labour and affective relations: time use and
the enjoyment of activities within couples. Sociology 30(1):79–100
Tertilt M (2005) Polygyny, fertility, and savings. J Polit Econ 113(6):1341–1371
Tertilt M (2006) Polygyny, women’s rights, and development. J Eur Econ Assoc 4(2–3):523–530
Ware H (1979) Polygyny: women’s views in a transitional society, Nigeria 1975. J Marriage Fam 41(1):
185–195
White LK (1983) Determinants of spacial interaction: marital structure or marital happiness. J Marriage
Fam 45:511–519
Wright RE (1994) The moral animal: Why we are the way we are: the new science of evolutionary psy-
chology. Vintage Books, New York
Zuo J (1992) The reciprocal relationship between marital interaction and marital happiness: a three-wave
study. J Marriage Fam 54(4):870–878
123
